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This paper advances the specification and estimation of models of retirement and saving in two earner
families. The complications introduced by the interaction of retirement decisions by husbands and
wives have led researchers to adopt a number of simplifications to increase the feasibility of estimating
family retirement models. Our model relaxes these restrictions. It includes the extended choice set
created when each spouse makes an independent retirement decision. It also includes the full range
of complexity found in dynamic-stochastic models of retirement decision making, so far analyzed
only in the context of single earner households. Retirement outcomes include full retirement, partial
retirement and full-time work. Reverse flows from states of lesser to greater work are also included.
The preference structure incorporates heterogeneity in time preference, varying taste parameters for
full-time and part-time work, and the possibility of changes in preferences after retirement. The opportunity
set reflects the full range of nonlinearities created by pensions and Social Security. Financial returns
are stochastic. Exogenous shocks such as layoffs are also included. Estimation is based on data from
the Health and Retirement Study.
 
The solution method is based on backward induction. We show that this method is superior to a method
based on a Nash equilibrium, providing plausible behavioral predictions when Nash equilibrium criteria
fall silent. 
 
In contrast to some recent studies, the findings suggest the flow of wives into the labor force in the
last few decades has probably reduced the amount of husbands’ work. The model also provides plausible
responses to various policies. For example, we find that any effort to promote opportunities for partial
retirement as a means to increase overall work is likely to be unsuccessful as any induced decline in












I. Introduction  
As the baby boomers begin to swell the ranks of the retired and increase demands on our 
retirement programs, retirement behavior and retirement saving are becoming an even more 
central concern of policy makers. Researchers and policy makers must fully understand 
retirement behavior if they are to determine how rules and regulations governing the Social 
Security system and private pensions influence retirement and saving outcomes, program 
participation and costs, and the welfare of retirees.  
Researchers continue to make progress toward a comprehensive econometric model of 
retirement and saving. Our aim in this paper is to make contributions on two levels. First, we 
contribute to the analysis of retirement and saving at the family level by introducing a level and 
complexity in the decision making of each spouse not found in previous work. Second, we bring 
together into a model of family retirement details regarding the choice set, preferences and 
constraints previously found only in models of retirement in one earner households, and typically 
not found together in a single model, even of one earner households.  
Among the features in our family retirement model: 1. Outcomes include full-time work, 
partial retirement and full retirement. 2. People are forward looking in their decision making. 3. 
Saving and retirement are jointly determined. 4. The analysis is structural. It specifies separately 
the preferences and constraints guiding each individual’s behavior. 5. Saving and retirement are 
modeled on the assumption that one cannot borrow on future income or Social Security. Thus 
liquidity constraints are incorporated into the analysis. 6. There is heterogeneity in time 
preference. This means that the response rates to future rewards from wages or from postponing 
Social Security or pension claiming differ among members of the population. It also means, 
consistent with the distribution of wealth, that some will be well prepared for retirement and 
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others poorly prepared. 7. There are two utility functions, two decision makers, and one budget 
constraint. Each spouse makes his or her own decisions. However, the decisions are made with 
awareness of the other spouse’s decision making, preferences and opportunity set, implications 
for the income and wealth of the household, for joint consumption, and for the welfare of the 
spouse. 8. In this specification, the solution to the model is not as obvious as in the case with a 
single (unitary) utility function. Household decision making is solved through backward 
induction. We show that this set up often provides different results from a solution based on a 
Nash equilibrium. That is, the Nash equilibrium, which assumes that each spouse takes the 
decision of the other spouse as given, is not always equivalent to methods in which the choice of 
each spouse takes into account the possible responses of the other spouse. For example, when 
decisions arrived at independently by each spouse, including awareness of the responses of their 
spouse, would leave both spouses worse off, the husband and wife are assumed to avoid this 
outcome. 9. The interactions of the decisions of each spouse are fully integrated into the 
estimation procedure. 10. The analysis is dynamic, following retirement outcomes from full-time 
to part-time work and or retirement, and following saving over the life cycle. 11. The analysis is 
stochastic. People may reduce their work effort over time, then subsequently increase it. Some 
people may return to the labor force after retiring fully, or increase their hours of work after 
partially retiring, as circumstances change, with some events foreseen and others not. Others may 
change their decisions as they realize they have made an error, or as decisions of husbands and 
wives interact in ways that have not previously been analyzed. 12. Incentives from pensions and 
Social Security are included on an individual basis for each individual in the sample. The 
analysis includes the effects of the very sharp, nonlinear incentives from defined benefit pensions 
that still account for two thirds of the pension wealth of those on the cusp of retirement. To do 
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this, the estimation makes use of linked data in calculating the opportunity set, including detailed 
pension plan descriptions obtained from employers and Social Security records. It does not use 
typical or representative pension incentives. 13. There are minimum hours constraints at work. 
Many jobs typically held in the prime working years and paying higher wages require full-time 
work or none at all. Partial retirement is not allowed on the main job unless specified. 14. The 
wage offer depends on tenure and on hours of work. Typically when one leaves a full-time job, 
the wage offer drops substantially, as it often does for part-time work. 15. Layoffs are 
incorporated in the analysis.  
The paper contributes to the analysis of decision making at the family level. Alternative 
rankings of husbands and wives among the many potential outcomes are modeled. This involves 
a richer array of outcomes than has been considered in earlier models of family decision making. 
Each spouse decides on full, partial or nonretirement, the path to be taken in future years, the 
implications for the behavior of the spouse and responses to changes in that behavior. 
Econometric estimation of this model is based on the Health and Retirement Study. The 
resulting model is sufficiently detailed to facilitate policy analysis, allowing researchers to 
change the specification of the equations representing the incentives created by Social Security, 
pensions, labor market opportunities, including the availability of partial retirement or spouse 
employment opportunities, and other constraints on individual behavior. With this model it is 
possible to judge the determinants of retirement and saving behavior, and to estimate the likely 
effects on both retirement and saving of those at different parts of the income and wealth 
distribution. 
We have conducted simulations to highlight important interdependencies that are lost in 
models that ignore the interaction of decisions reached by husbands and wives. For example, 
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given a certain juxtaposition of preferences, higher wealth at the beginning of the period, all 
other things being equal, may cause the work effort of one of the spouses to increase, even if the 
work effort of the other spouse remains the same. This is contrary to the usual implication from a 
unified model where a pure wealth effect should cause a decline in labor supply. Interactions 
between the decisions of husbands and wives also may induce a path where labor supply is first 
reduced, then increased.  
In a longer paper of the same title written for the National Institute on Aging, we have 
included simulations of the effects of a number of policy initiatives, including increasing the 
early entitlement age to Social Security, the effects of the trend from defined contribution to 
defined benefit plans, and a loss in assets of 25 percent, simulating the effects of the recent 
recession. To limit the length of this paper, the empirical analysis focuses on a detailed 
description of decision making at the household level. Simulations are then presented to 
highlight the unique features of the model.  
Section II highlights the many gaps in the retirement literature that have motivated the 
present study. Section III presents the stochastic, dynamic model of retirement where previously 
omitted dimensions of retirement and saving are included in an econometric model of decision 
making by the two earner family. The decision process in the two earner family is explored in 
Section IV. Data and estimation are discussed in Section V. Section VI presents a number of 
counter intuitive simulations designed to highlight the importance of specifying the full set of 
interactions in the two earner family. Section VII concludes. Two appendices have been posted 
with this working paper on the NBER web site. Appendix 1 describes the construction of the 
variables used in this study. Appendix 2 explores a number of issues encountered in estimating 
time preference from information on asset levels and retirement.  
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II. Gaps in The Retirement Literature 
Among the various dimensions of behavior that a retirement model should explain, a first 
requirement is that it explain the major flows among the various retirement states, including 
reverse flows.
1 In the process, it must also explain such major features of the retirement hazard 
as the spikes in retirement at ages 62 and 65. Second, the model should explain the joint 
distribution of retirement by husbands and wives. Retirement data clearly show that couples 
coordinate their retirement decisions.
2 A third requirement is that model outcomes are consistent 
with the wealth accumulated for retirement by each household.  
The majority of empirical retirement studies are reduced form or quasi reduced form. 
The dependent variable typically is some measure of retirement or labor force activity. 
Independent variables include a measure of incentives affecting labor-leisure choice, including 
some type of pension and/or Social Security delta, measuring the change in the present value of 
benefits if retirement is postponed. Typically these models assume that individuals are forward 
looking (Coile and Gruber, 2000). Consequently, decision makers consider not only the 
                                                            
1 Gustman and Steinmeier (1984) and Maestas (2010, forthcoming) provide detailed descriptive 
data documenting the various flows among retirement states. 
2 Couples coordinate their retirement despite age differences and differences in incentives to 
retire (Hurd, 1990; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000b, 2004; Maestas, 2001; and Michaud, 2003). 
A general overview of bargaining within the family is provided by Lundberg (1999). 
Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (2006) discuss decision making at the family level, 
including the inconsistencies between the data and parameters estimated for a unified model in 
which a single utility function is used to describe the consumption and labor supply of the 
family. For a nonparametric analysis of the determinants of household consumption that focuses 
on the problems of a unitary model in analyzing household consumption, but restricts the sample 
of couples to those that are fully employed and thus does not include an analysis of the 
determinants of labor supply, see Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2009). 
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immediate change in benefits from postponing retirement (or benefit claiming), but also the 
option value of being able to continue at work. 
One important limitation of reduced form models should be noted. They are unable to 
explain a key feature of the retirement hazard, the spike in retirements at age 62. It is not that the 
authors are unaware of the importance of the spike in retirement. Reduced form models often 
include age specific dummy variables on the right hand side of a retirement equation. The 
coefficient on a variable indicating the individual is age 62 is typically highly significant and 
very large. This coefficient estimate indicates the height of the retirement spike and age 62, but it 
does not explain the spike. The problem is that as soon as Social Security benefits become 
available at age 62, those with high time preference claim their benefits. Because the Social 
Security benefit structure is actuarially fair, the changes in the present value of benefits with 
retirement typically included in reduced form retirement equations are zero. Nor can a reduced 
form equation with an age dummy at 62 be used to analyze the effects of changing policies that 
have generated the spike. More generally, reduced form models confound the effects of 
unmeasured preferences with the economic incentives created by retirement programs, limiting 
the ability to predict the likely effects of policy changes on retirement outcomes. 
A related approach uses difference-in-difference analysis to analyze the effects of 
changes in government programs. Krueger and Pischke’s (1992) analysis of the effects of the 
notch in Social Security on retirement is a well known early example. In cases, where there are 
no unmeasured differences between the control group and the experimentals that affect 
retirement, the difference-in-difference analysis will successfully indicate the effects of the 
change being studied on retirement. However, this approach is not useful for analyzing the likely 
effects of new and untried policies, such as raising the Social Security early entitlement age.  
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In view of inability of reduced form equations to explain the key features of retirement 
outcomes and the related limitations of reduced form difference-in-difference analyses, 
researchers have continued working to improve structural retirement models. These models 
incorporate the separate influences of preferences and elements of budget constraint, including 
incentives shaped by Social Security and related retirement policies.
3  
Although the specifications of structural models are much more complex than reduced 
form equations, most structural models rely on simplifying assumptions to facilitate estimation. 
Unfortunately, in many cases these simplifications are not innocuous. As we will see, 
oversimplification frequently limits the ability of the model to explain key characteristics of 
retirement behavior. Even worse, oversimplification sometimes confounds various causes and/or 
creates biased estimates.  
Many structural retirement models ignore partial retirement and/or the complexity of 
retirement dynamics.
4 Some models include partial retirement but ignore reverse flows 
(Gustman and Steinmeier, 1986a), while other include retirement dynamics, but ignore partial 
retirement. For example, while Blau and Gilleskie (2006) pay a great deal of attention to th
dynamic structure of the dependent labor market status measure, Cutler, Liebman and Smyth 
e 
                                                            
3 The strength of reduced form studies is that they do not impose a rigid structure, so 
they are not subject to the kind of specification error that can affect the interpretation of key 
parameters in a structural model. Moreover, there is a fear that identification of structural models 
is based on functional form. As will be seen when we discuss our estimated model, however, 
estimation is based on many very different moments, while a standard specification is used for 
the utility function, greatly loosening the relation between identification and the form of the 
utility function. Moreover, identification is to a large part determined by nonlinearities in the 
budget constraint caused by retirement programs. These nonlinearities are estimated from 
original pension documents obtained from employers, as well as from Social Security rules. 
4 An important early study by Berkovec and Stern (1991) included reverse flows in their 
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. 19) note they make a trade-off by eliminating partial retirement as an option in the 
model.  
Another major problem is that until recently, structural models of retirement did not 
explicitly consider the joint determination of retirement and wealth. Saving was something that 
went on in the background and parameter estimates did not take account of the level of wealth 
accumulated by the household. These shortcomings were addressed by Rust and Phelan (19
who estimated a structural model that jointly considered retirement and saving. But they greatly 
oversimplified the budget constraint by assuming that capital and insurance markets were 
inoperative. French (2005) estimates a model with joint saving and r
tinues in French and Jones (2004). Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2006) also make
useful contribution in their joint analysis of retirement and wealth.  
However, these and other structural models continue to oversimplify the relation 
between retirement and saving. For example, French (2005) assumes the same time preference 
parameter for all individuals. As Cutler, Liebman and Smyth (2006) note, “French’s approa
does not allow for heterogeneity in preferences or heterogeneity in the da
tate variables. Moreover, French uses non-separable preferences that constrain the 
income and substitution effect of an increase in wage levels to cancel.”  
Returning to the complex retirement variable, as Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) show, a
model must be able to explain the spikes in retirement observed in the data at ages 62 a
well as the very wide distributions of wealth at each level of lifetime earnings.
5 However, oth
simplifications found in recent contributions to the structural retirement literature also 
 
5 Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) and Venti and Wise (1999) demonstrate the extent to 
which asset accumulation varies among those who have the same lifetime earnings.  
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importantly affect the ability of the model to reproduce retirement and wealth outcomes. For 
example, Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2006) allow for heterogeneity in the consumption 
parameter, but not in the time preference rate. Heterogeneity in the consumption parameter is not 





 a large majority of 
couples
Unless there is some arbitrary parameter in the utility function at age 62, we are 
essentially back to the same problem that plagues the reduced form option value model. 
Some investigators who recognize the important effects of simplification resort to 
estimating for limited subsamples to avoid having to include certain complexities in their 
models. For example, a researcher whose model cannot address nonlinearities, such as those 
created by discontinuities commonly found in defined benefit pension formulas, may limit t
sample to those who do not have a defined benefit pension. Rust and his colleagues (in Benite
Silva et al., 1999 and Benitez-Silva et al., 2004) limit the sample to exclude those who are 
covered by a pension. Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2006) eliminate from their sample those 
who have a DB plan on their current job, as well as those who had a DC plan at any time. Fr
(2005) uses summary measures of pension incentives rather than the individual accrual profiles 
relevant to the particular observation. Bound et al. (2006) assume, counterfactually, that all 
defined contribution assets and nonpension wealth are paid out as an annuity. In addition, they 
do not allow saving in their model. As a result, all payments are assumed to be immediately 
consumed and there is too rigid a linkage between the timing of income, including the assumed 
timing of income from assets, and the timing of expenses. Resulting parameter estimates are 
highly unlikely to be representative of the population values, especially since
 approaching retirement age who are covered by a pension continue to be covered by a 
defined benefit pension plan (Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai, 2010a).  
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Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) models the joint determination of retirement and wealth, 
while Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai (2010b) allows reversals of flows from states of 
greater to lesser retirement. These studies are able to reproduce spikes in the retirement hazard of 
appropr e 
nings, or 
d. For example, Bound et al. 
(2006) 
p in policy 




iate size at ages 62 and 65. However, these papers take the retirement decision of th
spouse to be exogenous.  
Some retirement studies include the effects of joint retirement decision making of 
husbands and wives, but most do not. Most studies include families, both those with 
single earners and those including two earners, but they either ignore spouse ear
if included treat spouse earnings as exogenously determine
confine their estimation to single individuals, and thus do not deal with 
interactions between spouses at the level of the family.  
Turning now to studies that do focus on joint retirement decision making, some models 
such as Coile (1999) are clearly reduced form. They will be of only limited hel
, and the parameters estimated cannot be directly related to the deeper paramete
the utility function and separated from the elements of the budget constraint.  
There are a few structural studies of the determination of retirement within 
household. To simplify analysis to make room for considerations arising at the family 
level, the studies currently available do not include many of the advances found in 
structural retirement models of the behavior of individuals. For example, Gustman an
Steinmeier (2000) focuses on the joint determination of retirement, but the analysis doe
not include partial retirement, reverse retirement flows, or the joint determination of 
saving. In the absence of consideration of the joint determination of household wealth 
together with the retirement decisions of each spouse, the models lose their ability to 
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generate the key spike in retirement at age 62. Blau and Gilleskie (2006) pay a great deal 
of attention to the dynamic structure of the dependent labor market status measure, but 
again do not include saving or related behavior. Other studies of retirement suffering fr
these or related limitations include Blau (1997, 1998) an
om 
d Michaud (2003). Gustman and 
Steinme  
 of 






(2001), where the weights depend on the responses of the two spouses to questions 
relating to which spouse has more influence on the financial decisions of the household.
6 
                                                           
ier (2004), a model that jointly addresses retirement and saving decisions in a
family context, nevertheless ignores partial retirement.  
Once independent decision making is allowed within the context of a family 
model, it is useful to consider the various ways in which the retirement decisions
spouses may be related. Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) estimat
ion in budget constraints, correlation in preferences, and dependence of 
preferences of one spouse on the retirement status of the other.  
A simple model for analyzing the retirement dates of the two individuals assumes
a household utility function which is a weighted average of the utility functions of the tw
spouses. Blundell et al. (2001) uses a static, working life framework. There is no saving, 
and the emphasis seems to be on the issue of whether consumption is private to the two 
spouses or public between them. The analysis considers the relative weight in the decision
process given to each spouse. In this setting, the problem reverts to maximizing a sin
function with respect to the budget constraint. The weights can be variable, as in Maestas 
 
6 Blundell et al. (2001) use weighted utility functions, but in this model (and unlike Maestas) the 
weights have an unobserved effects component. Since they eventually linearize virtually 
everything, this does not have serious consequences, but it would introduce some large 
difficulties in a more structural environment. 
  11 
The weighting model can reproduce joint retirement in approximately the right amounts. 
However, the weighting model does not reproduce the spike in retirements at age 62.
7  
Consider another simplification in the basic specifications adopted in these 
models. In modeling retirement within the family, Maestas (2001) attempts to distinguish 
the effects of correlated preferences from bargaining power within the family and 
introduces information from the HRS on the relative influence of each spouse on decision 
making within the family. However, she assumes that husbands respond to leisure 
complementarity while the wife does not, a relationship that should be a product of her 
analysis.  
The models of family retirement also simplify their treatment of pensions. Even 
though employer provided pension data are very useful in identifying the sources of 
incentives independently affecting the behavior of husbands and wives, most family 
retirement models do not include the separate incentives of pension plans held by each 
spouse. Thus this important source of identification is not available to studies that 
eliminate those with a pension from the sample, or who use files with imputed pension 
wealth that by design cannot catch the nonlinearities creating the spike in DB accrual 
profiles at early retirement age (e.g., Cutler, Liebman and Smythe, 2006). Taking an 
analogous approach, Maestas (2001) throws out observations with DB plans so she can 
                                                            
7 Note that it is in general never optimal for the standpoint of one spouse to have the remaining 
spouse retire earlier, since this does not increase the utility of the first spouse’s retirement and 
only reduces the income available for consumption. Since weighting means that the retirement of 
each spouse is in effect a compromise between the desires of the two spouses, it tends to 
eliminate the spikes in retirement that would otherwise be apparent. In our attempts to estimate 
the model using weighted functions, the retirement spikes of the two spouses were small 
fractions of 1 percentage point. Thus while we expect interdependence of spouse decision 
making to reduce the age 62 spike somewhat, and to spread retirements to other years, using a 
weighted function reduces the age 62 spike much too much, virtually eliminating it. 
  12 
ignore the pension spikes, losing an important potential source of model identification 
between husbands and wives in the process. Michaud (2003) also ignores the spikes in 
accruals. Turning once again to Maestas (2001), she also assumes there is a perfect capital 
market and that one can freely borrow from Social Security and pension wealth. Once the 
assumption of perfect capital markets is relaxed, as discussed previously, it is important to 
allow for heterogeneity in time preference, something none of these models allows. 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2000, 2004), precursors to the current paper, provide an 
exception. 
All of these efforts by previous researchers have contributed to our understanding 
of joint retirement behavior within the household, and suggest a number of basic 
conclusions. They provide an important foundation for ongoing analyses. But the extent 
of omissions and simplifications creates doubt about the reliability of their findings. To 
address the remaining questions, we turn to a more comprehensive specification of the 
family retirement model, and attempt to estimate it using all of the information available 
in the HRS for describing retirement and saving behavior. 
III. The Dynamic, Stochastic Model 
  The utility functions of the two spouses are fairly standard functions of consumption (a 
public good within the household) and labor supply over the lifetime. For the husband, the 




























In this function,  Cm,t  is consumption at time  t  in survival state  m,  where  m  is an indicator 
whether both spouses are still living at time  t,  only the husband is living at time  t,  or only the 
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wife is living. sm,t  is the probability that the household will be in state  m  at time  t.    and     
are the leisure amounts of the husband and wife, respectively, at time  t,  and     is the value of 
leisure to the husband. Note that the value of leisure to the husband may depend on the amount 
of leisure of the wife in the same period. The exponential form preceding     is a multiplicative 
factor for the value of leisure. It consists of a standard linear form  Xβ  plus an individual effect  
ε  which reflects the strength of the husband’s preferences for retirement over work. The 
elements of  X  contain a constant, age, and health status. As age increases, work gradually 
becomes more onerous and retirement more desirable. When the utility of retirement exceeds the 















  Leisure can take on three values associated with full-time work, partial retirement, and 
full retirement. The value of retirement for the husband can be modified if the wife is also 
retired. For the case where the wife is working full-time, the basic value of leisure     f o r  t h e  
husband is normalized to zero if he is working full-time, unity if he is fully retired, and     i f  
he is partially retired. Note that if leisure is a normal good, which we assume that it is, the value 
of     should fall between one-half and one if partial retirement is equated with approximately 
half-time work. The closer the value is to one, the greater the value of partial retirement is 
relative to full retirement, and the more frequently and longer should be the spells of partial 
retirement. 
  The model allows for the value of retirement to be increased if the husband prefers to 
spend time with the wife, and the wife is also retired. In the case without partial retirement, this 
can be accomplished simply by adding a term to the  Xβ  linear form that has whether the spouse 
is retired as an additional variable. With partial retirement, however, the picture is a little more 
complex. The general idea is that the wife’s retirement adds to the utility of the husband’s 
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retirement only up to the point of the husband’s retirement. If the husband is partially retired, it 
doesn’t matter whether the wife is fully retired or partially retired, since the additional leisure of 
the wife if she is fully retired doesn’t add anything to the husband’s leisure during the time that 
the husband is at work. If the husband is fully retired, however, it does make a difference 
whether the wife is partially retired or fully retired, since only the part of his leisure that he 
shares with the wife is augmented. If the augmentation factor is  g,  the values of the function  

















       H u s b a n d ’ s   R e t i r e m e n t   S t a t u s  
 
            Full-Time       Partial                  Full 
               Work    Retirement              Retirement 
 
   Wife’s  Full-Time Work          0             V            1 
Retirement  Partial Retirement          0            g            g  + (1 -   
h
P V
    Status  Full Retirement          0            gV            g 
  If the husband is working full time, he doesn’t have any leisure, and the value of the 
leisure is zero regardless of the retirement status of the wife. If the husband is partially retired, 
the value of leisure is     if the wife is working full-time, and this gets multiplied by a factor of  
g  if the wife is working at least part time. If the husband is fully retired, the value of leisure is 
unity, and this again gets multiplied by a factor of  g  if the wife is also fully retired. If the wife is 
partially retired, then we can divide the husband’s leisure into two parts. The partial retirement 
leisure has a value of   ,  and this gets multiplied by  g  because the wife is also partially 
retired. The remaining leisure has a value of  1 -  ,  but this leisure does not get multiplied 
because the wife is not there for this leisure. The total value of the husband’s leisure is the sum 
of these two parts. 









L ) L , (L
t m, t
w






















Where the superscripts and subscripts  w  refer to the wife’s utility and leisure. The budget 
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All quantities in the equation are measured in real terms. Assets, which are constrained to be 
non-negative, grow at the real interest rate  rt. The second term on the right side is the husband’s 
earnings, and the fourth term is the wife’s earnings. The third and fifth terms are the husband’s 
and wife’s pension and Social Security benefits, respectively. Although not indicated by the 
notation, these benefits depend on the past work and retirement decisions. In the case of Social 
Security, these can even depend on the past work and retirement decisions of the spouse. The 
term  It  is any inheritances that the household may receive, and the last term is household 
consumption. Note that consumption is dependent on the survival state of the household, and that 
the budget constraint must hold regardless of the mortality experience. 
  The stochastic structure of the model is as follows. The real interest rate  rt  is stochastic 
and is assumed to come from the actual distribution of asset returns, as documented by Ibbotson. 
The time periods in this model are annual, and we assume that asset returns are uncorrelated over 
time, which is approximately the case. The time preference parameter  ρ  is assumed to be 
heterogeneous over the population of households, and we treat the value of this parameter as 
being a fixed effect whose value is estimated for every household in the population.
8  The 
 
8 It would be preferable to allow time preference to have separate values for each of the two 
spouses. However, allowing for separate time preference parameters for each spouse within the 
household would introduce enough additional complexity to preclude our being able to estimate 
the model. 
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mortality outcomes reflected in the underlying the survival state probabilities  sm,t  are also 
considered stochastic. 
  The two epsilon terms in the linear forms multiplying leisure,  εh  and  εw,  are considered 
to come from normal distributions with a mean of zero and standard deviations of  σh  and  σw,  
respectively, and with a correlation parameter  ρε. These terms allow husbands and wives to have 
different preferences for leisure vs. work, and the correlation allows for the possibility that one 
reason that the spouses in households may retire at about the same time is that the two spouses 
share the same attitudes toward leisure vs. work. For estimation purposes, the initial values of 
these two epsilon terms are treated as random effects. After the individual first leaves full-time 
work, the value of leisure may suffer an unanticipated change. For instance, it may fall if the 
individual finds that leisure is not as pleasurable as anticipated. This may provide one reason 
why individuals return to work after retirement. To provide for this possibility, the model allows 
the value of the epsilons to change over time after the initial retirement, with correlation 
parameters over time of  ρh  and  ρw  for the husband and wife, respectively. We considered the 
possibility that the spouses might anticipate that the values of leisure might change after 
retirement, but this led to problems that are discussed in Appendix 2. As a result, the model 
assumes that these changes are completely unanticipated. 
  The final stochastic elements, which are stochastic from the estimator’s point of view but 
not from the individual’s point of view, are the values of partial retirement,    and   . These 
are assumed to come from an exponential distribution     defined over the 
interval  0.5  to  1,  where  c  is a factor necessary to make the integral of the distribution over the 
allowable range equal to 1, as must be the case for all distributions. The higher γ ,  the greater 
















likely that he will go through a period of partial retirement. Conditional on employment, the 
probability of partial retirement increases with age. Accordingly, we allow the value of     to 
increase with age according to the equation   ,  where     is the husband’s age 
at time  t. We characterize the husband’s relative preference for partial retirement as not 
changing. Consequently, the model assumes that the husband’s relative position within this 
distribution does not change even as the entire distribution changes to higher values of   .  T h e  

















  The sequence of events in the model is as follows. In every period, the couple starts with 
a level of assets. If the husband was still in his career job in the previous period and if that job 
had a defined contribution pension, he may also have a given level of defined contribution 
pension assets. If he was not in the career job in the previous period but had a defined benefit 
pension in that job, he may also have a pension benefit amount, which may or may not be 
currently collectable. The same situation with regard to pension amounts also applies to the wife. 
Further, the household may be eligible to collect a given level of Social Security benefits, either 
currently or sometime in the future. Given their current situation, the spouses make their 
decisions as to what their retirement status (working full-time, partial retirement, or full 
retirement) will be during the current period, and how much they will save or spend down from 
their accumulated assets. At the end of the current period, a random draw is taken from the 
distribution of asset returns, and assets plus any defined contribution amounts are assumed to 
grow at that rate of asset returns. One of the spouses may die, causing a transition between the 
survival states. Depending on the retirement status decisions made in the current period, the 
amount of future defined benefit pensions and Social Security amounts may also be increased. 
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  The model assumes that before age 50, the spouses are working at whatever their 
earnings were before age 50. After age 70, the spouses are assumed to be retired. These 
assumptions are made in order to reduce computational burden somewhat. Between ages 50 and 
70, the spouses make their decisions about working full-time, partially retiring, or fully retiring. 
With two utility functions, two decision makers, and one budget constraint, the solution of the 
model is not as obvious as in the case with a single utility function. The mechanism by which 
they make these decisions is relatively complex and is described in detail in the next section. 
Note that if one of the spouses is below 50 years of age or above 70, and the other is within the 
50 to 70 age range, only the spouse within the age range will need to make a work/retirement 
decision. At all ages, however, decisions are made as to how much to consume, given income in 
the current period and the assets owned when the couple entered the period. 
  The number of state variables depends on what period of life the spouses are in, and 
whether they are still in their career jobs. For all ages, one of the state variables is the amount of 
accumulated assets. Below age 50, the primary additional state variable is the amount 
accumulated in defined contribution pension plans, if the career job had these kinds of pensions. 
Up to age 70, each spouse has a value of ε, which relates to the preference for work vs. 
retirement. After age 70, ε is irrelevant, since past that age individuals are presumed to be retired. 
Between ages 50 and 70, the most important state variable is whether each spouse is still in his or 
her career job. If so, the associated state variable is the amount in the defined contribution plan. 
If the spouse has left the career job, there are two state variables associated with pensions and a 
third associated with Social Security. One pension variable relates to the level of pension 
benefits, and the other is a binary variable related to whether the individual can currently receive 
the benefits or must wait until a later date, as would occur if the individual had left the career job 
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before becoming eligible for early retirement benefits. The Social Security variable is one of a 
pair of such variables (one for the husband and one for the wife) that define the level of joint 
Social Security benefits that the couple is eligible for. The pension and Social Security variables 
are initially set at the point the individual leaves the career job. For the pension variable, this 
value is adjusted downward over time, since few pensions are fully indexed for inflation. For the 
Social Security variable, the value for future periods may be increased if the individual returns to 
full-time work or engages in partial retirement work, an increase that is due either to a reduction 
in the early reduction amount or an increase in the delayed retirement amount. However, the 
amount of the Social Security value that may be collected in the current period may be reduced if 
the individual works either full-time or part-time and the earnings from that work exceed the 
earnings test limit of Social Security. Past age 70, the pension amounts (except for the inflation 
erosion) and the Social Security amounts are fixed at their levels at age 70. 
  In the estimations and simulations, all continuous variables (assets, the epsilons, pension 
and Social Security amounts) are broken down into a vector of discrete amounts. If required, any 
amount between these discrete amounts is interpolated. 
  
IV. The Decision Process 
  This section describes the process by which, in each period, the husband decides how 
much he will work and the wife decides how much she will work. Each spouse is cognizant of 
the possibility that their own decision may influence the decision of the spouse, and they take 
account of these ramifications in making their own decision. Since these decisions are being 
made in a backwards induction framework, it is assumed that the spouses have already calculated 
how their current decisions will affect their future decisions. 
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A. Joint Decisions with a Work/Retirement Choice. 
  To begin this analysis, it will help to look first at a framework where each spouse is 
deciding either to work full time or retire. This leaves the analysis of partial retirement until later 
in the section. In such a framework, the joint decision result has four possibilities: both spouses 
work; both spouses retire; the husband works and the wife retires; and the husband retires and the 
wife works. These possibilities can be represented by the following grid: 
      H u s b a n d ’ s   D e c i s i o n  
      W o r k    R e t i r e  
    Wife’s   Work        A        B 
    Decision  Retire        C        D 
Thus, decision B is for the husband to retire and the wife to work, and similarly with the other 
alternatives. 
  Both the husband and the wife have utility values associated with each of these 
alternatives. Let     be the husband’s utility if the wife works and the husband retires. This 
utility will include the utility of decisions in future periods, given the income and consumption in 
the current period and any restrictions that the current decision to work places on future 
decisions. For instance, the decision to be retired in the current period may mean that in any 
future periods the wage rate for full-time work will be lower than if the husband had continued in 














If     ,  it means that the husband prefers to retire, given that the wife is working 
full-time. If  U >   ,  it means that the husband prefers working full-time, give that the wife 
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is retired. This situation can be represented by drawing horizontal arrows between the 
corresponding decision points, as follows: 
     A   → B 
     C   ← D 
where the arrows point to the preferred decision between the two choices. If     ,  it 
means that the wife prefers working full time to retirement, given that the husband is also 
working full-time. If     ,  it means that the wife prefers retirement to working, given 
than the husband is retired. The situation for the wife can be represented by vertical arrows 









     A    B  
     ↑   ↓ 
     C    D  
where again the arrows point to the preferred decision between the two choices. We can 
represent the combined preferences for both the husband and the wife by including both sets of 
arrows, as follows: 
     A   → B 
     ↑   ↓ 
     C   ← D 
  Since it takes four arrows to denote the relative preferences of both the husband and wife, 
and since any of these arrows can point in two directions, there are sixteen combinations of 
arrows that represent any combination of preferences of the two spouses. These sixteen 
combinations may be represented as follows: 
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 1.  A   →  B       2.  A   →  B       3.  A   ←  B       4.  A   ← B 
  ↓  ↓   ↓  ↓   ↓  ↓   ↓  ↓ 
  C       →  D    C   ←  D    C   →  D    C   ← D 
 
     5.  A   →  B       6.  A   →  B       7.  A   ←  B       8.  A   ← B 
  ↓  ↑   ↓  ↑   ↓  ↑   ↓  ↑ 
  C       →  D    C   ←  D    C   →  D    C   ← D 
 
     9.  A   →  B     10.  A   →  B     11.  A   ←  B     12.  A   ← B 
  ↑  ↓   ↑  ↓   ↑  ↓   ↑  ↓ 
  C       →  D    C   ←  D    C   →  D    C   ← D 
 
   13.  A   →  B     14.  A   →  B     15.  A   ←  B     16.  A   ← B 
  ↑  ↑   ↑  ↑   ↑  ↑   ↑  ↑ 
  C       →  D    C   ←  D    C   →  D    C   ← D 
We will analyze each of these combinations in turn. Since the combinations below the main 
diagonal of this chart (combinations 5, 9, 10, 13, 14, and 15) are mirror reflections of 
combinations above the main diagonal, we need only to analyze the combinations on or above 
the main diagonal, and the results can be applied to the mirror images. 
  1. This is a case where the husband wants to retire, given the wife’s decision, and the 
wife wants to do likewise. But the arrows do not take account of the fact that each spouse’s 
decision may influence the other spouse’s decision. The husband has two choices: to retire 
regardless of the wife’s decision or to wait to see what the wife will do and then decide what he 
wants to do as a result. If he retires, he knows that his wife will also retire, and the result will be 
combination  D. If he waits to make his decision, the decision shifts to the wife. She knows that 
if she retires, he will too, and the result will be combination  D. If neither one takes the decision 
to retire, they will stay at combination  A. Thus, the final choice for both spouses is between 
combination  A  and combination  D. If either spouse prefers combination  D  to  combination  
A,  that spouse will retire, and the other spouse will follow, and the final result will be 
combination  D. But if both spouses prefer combination  A  to combination  D,  neither spouse 
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will have the incentive to be the first to retire, and the final result will be combination  A,  which 
both spouses prefer. 
  2. In this case the husband prefers to retire if the wife works, but to work if the wife 
retires. The wife wants to retire, given either decision of the husband. The key to understanding 
this case is to compare the husband’s utility of combinations A and C. These are two 
combinations where the husband is working, but the wife is either working or retired. Since the 
husband is working and the utility value of leisure is zero, whether the wife works or not does 
not affect the value of the leisure term in the husband’s utility function. However, if she works, 
there will be additional income to the family, and this additional income will increase the 
consumption component of the husband’s utility function. Hence, the husband’s utility will be 
higher if the wife works, and he will prefer combination A to combination C. Since in this case 
the husband prefers combination C to combination D and combination B to combination A, this 
gives a strict ordering of the husband’s preferences among the four combinations:  B > A > C > 
D, where combination B is the most preferred and combination D is the least preferred. 
  The husband might prefer combination B to combination A, but he knows that if he 
retires his wife will certainly follow suit, leaving him with combination D, his least preferred 
result. To avoid this, the husband will continue working. The wife knows that the husband will 
continue working in any case, so her choice is between combination A and combination C. 
According to her preferences, she chooses combination C. Thus, combination C is the final result 
in this case. 
  3. Here, the wife’s preference is to retire, given a retirement decision by the husband. For 
the husband, his preference is to do the same thing as his wife does, given her decision. This case 
is similar to case 1. The husband knows that if he retires first, his wife will follow, leading to 
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combination D. The wife knows that if she retires first, her husband will follow, again leading to 
combination D. If neither retires, they will remain at combination A. The final decision depends 
on the relative preferences between combinations A and D by the two spouses. If either spouse 
prefers combination D to combination A, that spouse will retire, and the other spouse will follow 
suit. If both spouses prefer combination A to combination D, neither spouse will want to be the 
first to retire, and combination A will be the result. 
  4. This is a case where the husband wants to work, given either decision of his wife, and 
the wife wants to retire, given either decision of her husband. The husband knows that if he 
retires, his wife will too, and combination D will be the result. However, by the same reasoning 
as in case 2, the husband will prefer combination A to combination C, and given the preferences 
in this case he will prefer combination C to combination D. By transitivity, this means that both 
combinations A and C are preferred to combination D, so the husband will not want to be the 
first to retire. Given that the husband is continuing to work, his wife’s choice comes down to 
combination A or combination C, and given her preferences, she will choose combination C. 
Thus, the final result in this case is combination C. 
  6. In this case, both partners want to do the opposite of their spouse’s choice, given their 
spouse’s choice. By the same reasoning as was applied to case 2, the four outcomes can be 
ranked by the husband as B > A > C > D, with combination B as the most preferred and 
combination D as the least preferred. Symmetric reasoning applied to the wife’s preferences 
yields a ranking by the wife of the four outcomes as C > A > B > D, with combination C as the 
most preferred and combination D as the least preferred. The ideal situation for the husband 
would be for him to retire first. In this case, the best choice for the wife would be for her to 
continue working, leading to choice B. This is the best outcome from the husband’s perspective, 
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but only the third choice outcome for the wife. For the wife, her ideal situation is for her to retire 
first. If she does this, her husband will continue to work, and the outcome will be combination C. 
This is her most preferred outcome, but not so good for the husband. 
  The incentives for this case are for each spouse to be the first to retire. But if they both 
retire, the result will be combination D, which is the worst result for both spouses. We assume in 
this case that the spouses cooperate enough that they want to avoid the worst result, and that 
neither one retires. This would lead to combination A, which although not the most preferred 
outcome for either spouse, is the second choice outcome for both spouses. This avoids a 
destructive race to see who can be the first to retire, which risks producing the least preferred 
outcome for both spouses. 
  7. This is a case where the husband wants to do the same thing as the wife, given the 
wife’s decision, but she wants to do the opposite of the husband, given his decision. The key to 
analyzing this case is to look as the wife’s ordering of the four outcomes. By the same reasoning 
as used in case 6 (which is symmetric to the reasoning used in case 2), her ordering of the four 
outcomes is C > A > B > D, where C is her most preferred outcome and D is her least preferred 
outcome. She knows that if she retires, her husband will follow suit, and the result will be 
combination D, which is her least preferred outcome. Thus, she will not want to retire. This 
leaves the husband with the choice between combinations A and B, and by his preferences in this 
case he will choose not to retire. This leaves the final result in this case as combination A, where 
both spouses continue working. 
  8. Here, the husband wants to continue working, given either choice by the wife, while 
the wife prefers to work if the husband retires and retire if the husband works. For the wife, by 
the same reasoning used in case 5, the ordering of her preferences is C > A > B > D. If the wife 
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retires first, the husband will continue working, and the resulting combination C will give her the 
most preferred outcome. If the husband were to retire first, the wife would continue to work, and 
the resulting outcome would be combination B. The final result depends on the husband’s 
evaluation of combination B vs. combination C, an ordering that is not a priori determined by the 
preferences in this case. If the husband prefers combination C, he may simply let the wife retire 
first. If the husband prefers combination B to combination C, the situation reverts to much the 
same situation as occurred in case 6. Both spouses will have an incentive to retire first, but if 
both succeed in retiring, the result will be combination D. This combination is the least preferred 
result for the wife. For the husband, the ordering of the outcomes becomes A > B > C > D, so 
that combination D is his least preferred outcome as well. Thus, both spouses would have an 
incentive to avoid the consequences of both of them trying to retire first, and both retiring. We 
assume that in this case, the spouses cooperate enough that neither of them tries to be the first to 
retire, and the resulting outcome of combination A is more preferred by both spouses than is 
combination D, which would be the result if both of them tried to retire first and both succeeded. 
The final outcome in this case is combination C if the husband prefers combination C to 
combination B, and combination A otherwise. 
  11. In this case, both spouses prefer to do the same thing as the other spouse, given the 
other spouse’s decision. The husband knows that if he retires his wife will as well, and the 
resulting outcome will be combination D. Symmetrically, the wife knows that if she retires, her 
husband will too, with combination D as the result. If neither retires, the result will be 
combination A. The final outcome depends on the assessment of both spouses of combination A 
relative to combination D. If either spouse finds that combination D is preferable to combination 
A, that spouse will retire and the other spouse will follow, with combination D as the final result. 
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If both spouses find that combination A is preferable to combination D, neither will want to be 
the first to retire, and the final outcome will be combination A. 
  12. The preferences in this case indicate that the husband wants to work, given either 
decision by the wife, while the wife wants to do the same thing as the husband, given the 
husband’s decision. This is perhaps the most complicated of the cases. The husband knows that 
if he retires, the wife will also retire, and the resulting outcome will be combination D. If the 
husband prefers combination A to combination D, he will want to continue working. Since the 
wife will want to continue workings if the husband continues working, the resulting outcome 
will be combination A. If, on the other hand, the husband prefers combination D to combination 
A, he will have an incentive to retire. If the wife prefers combination D to combination C, she 
will allow him to retire, and she will follow, resulting in combination D being the outcome. If, 
however, she prefers combination C to combination D, she would want to be the first to retire, 
since if she retires first, the husband will continue working. This outcome would also be 
preferable to the husband over combination D, so he will refrain from retiring and allow the wife 
to retire first. The final outcome will be combination A if the husband prefers it over 
combination D. Otherwise, the outcome will be combination D if the wife prefers it over 
combination C, and if not the outcome will be combination C. 
  16. This case reflects a situation where both spouses want to continue working, given 
either decision of the other spouse. The husband knows that if he retires first, the wife will 
continue to work. This would result in combination B, which the husband finds less preferable 
than combination A. Similarly, the wife knows that if she retires first, the husband will continue 
to work. For her, the resulting combination C is less preferable than combination A. Thus, both 
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spouses will have an incentive not to retire, and the final result is that both of them will work, 
yielding combination A as the result. 
  These results may be summed up in the following table: 
                 Husband’s Preferences 
Wife’s   A   →  B    A   →  B    A   ←  B    A   ← B 
Preferences  C   →  D    C   ←  D    C   →  D    C   ← D 
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In the table, the columns represent the husband’s preferences. For instance, the second column 
corresponds to the case where      (the husband prefers to retire, given that the wife is 
working) and      (the husband prefers to work, given that the wife is retired). The rows 
refer to the wife’s preferences. In several cases, the preferences between working and retiring, 
given the retirement state of the spouse, are not sufficient by themselves to determine the 
decision, in which case other relationships between the utilities of one or both spouses are 






B. Decisions with Partial Retirement. 
  The addition of partial retirement introduces a third choice for both the husband and the 
wife, but the general method of analysis remains the same. To analyze the choices with partial 
retirement, we denote the nine possible outcomes as follows: 
       H u s b a n d ’ s   R e t i r e m e n t   S t a t e  
               Working    Partially Retired    Fully Retired 
W i f e ’ s    W o r k i n g     A     B     C  
Retirement  Partially  Retired   D    E    F 
S t a t e    F u l l y   R e t i r e d     G     H     I  
Again, each of these states has a utility value associated with it for both the husband and the 
wife. Each spouse knows that the other spouse may react to their decision, and they make their 
own decisions with regard to the other spouse’s reactions. 
  The general approach is similar to the case previously described with only the two 
choices of working or retirement. At the beginning of each period each spouse calculates the 
utility of retiring, given the other spouse’s reaction. Each spouse then ascertains whether it would 
be better to go ahead and retire, given the other spouse’s reaction, or continue working and 
allowing the other spouse to make the decision either to continue working or retire. If both 
spouses conclude that they are better off working, or if only one spouse concludes that it is in his 
or her interest to retire first, then those decisions determine the final outcome. If each spouse 
concludes that it is in his or her interest to be the first to retire, then there is a possible conflict in 
the decisions that is in need of resolution. 
  To be more specific, consider the case of the husband deciding whether to be the first to 
retire. If he initially retires fully, then the wife must decide, given the husband’s decision to retire 
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fully, whether to continue working, to partially retire, or to retire fully herself. Call the utility 
value of the resulting combination  , which indicates the final utility if the husband makes 
the initial decision to fully retire. An alternative is for the husband to initially retire partially. In 
that case, the wife must again decide whether to continue working, to retire partially, or to retire 
fully. If she decides to retire partially, that corresponds to combination E on the diagram above. 
But the repercussions may not stop there. In response to her decision to retire partially, the 
husband may decide to retire fully as a result, and it is possible that this may further induce the 
wife to retire fully. The analysis from combination E may be done in the same fashion as the 
two-by-two analysis done previously, considering only the combinations E, F, H, and I. From E, 
any of these combinations are possible as each spouse decides whether it is in his or her best 
interest to retire fully, given that both spouses are at least partially retired. An alternative for the 
wife is that she may decide to retire fully, given that her husband has partially retired. In this 
case, she takes into account that her husband may decide to retire fully if she does. Given the 
possible reactions of the husband, then, the wife compares the utility of the final outcomes and 
decides whether to partially retire or fully retire, given that her husband partially retires. For the 
husband, the utility of the final outcome, given his initial decision to partially retire, may be 
denoted as  U . For the husband, the decision as to whether he is better off by initially retiring 
partially or fully is determined by comparing   and  . H would make the choice 
associated with the greater utility. That utility may be denoted as   ,  which may be interpreted 
as the utility that the husband would derive if he were the first to make the decision to retire in 
some form. The wife makes a symmetric decision as to what her utility would be if she were the 















  Each spouse must then make the decision whether it would be advantageous to retire 
first. If the husband retires first, his utility would be  . If he does not retire first, then the wife 
would choose whether to retire or to keep working. That is, she would choose between her 
retirement choice, with utility  ,  or the outcome where both spouses were working full-time, 
which for her has a utility value of  . Let the higher utility value be denoted as  U,  w h e r e  
the subscript  wC  stands for “wife’s choice.”  Correspondingly, let the husband’s utility for this 
outcome be  . This is basically the utility for the husband if he initially just keeps on 
working. The husband then compares   t o    to decide whether he wants to make the initial 
move towards retirement. If   is the higher value, he wants to retire initially because if he 
leaves the initial decision to his wife, the utility value will be lower. If   is the higher value, 
on the other hand, he is content to let the wife make the initial decision to retire if she so chooses 
because that will yield a higher utility to the husband than if he retires first. Needless to say, the 























  There are four possible outcomes to this process. Each spouse may conclude that it is not 
in his or her best interest to initiate retirement, in which case both will continue to work full-
time. A second possibility is that the husband may conclude that it in his best interest to partially 
or fully retire, knowing that the wife may ultimately partially or fully retire as a result, and the 
wife concludes that it is in her interest to let the husband do so. A third possibility is the 
symmetric case where the wife concludes that it is in her best interest to initiate retirement, and 
the husband concludes that it is in his interest to let her do so. In both the second and third cases, 
there is no conflict between the spouses as to what to do, so the spouse that initially decides on 
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retirement can do so, and the other spouse will respond accordingly. The fourth case is that both 
spouses may decide that it is to their advantage to make the initial retirement decision before the 
other. In this last case there is a conflict between the decisions of the two spouses which needs to 
be resolved. 
  If both spouses attempt to carry out their retirement desires simultaneously, the final 
result depends on whether those desires were for partial retirement or full retirement. If both 
spouses want to partially retire, then they would be a combination E in the diagram above. At 
that point, one or both of them could decide that they would prefer to be fully retired, according 
to the decision dynamics relating to the combinations E, F, H, and I. If the decision of one of the 
spouses is full retirement, then the remaining spouse would have to choose whether, given the 
full retirement decision of the first spouse, the second spouse wanted to be partially or fully 
retired. If the decision of both spouses is to be fully retired, then that is the choice if both spouses 
pursue their desired for retirement. Whatever the case, let the utility of the two spouses if they 
both pursue retirement be given as     and   ,  where  bR  signifies that both spouses are 













  This is not the end of the story, however. It may well be that having both spouses 
working dominates the scenario where both spouses try to retire. This would occur if       
and     . In this case, it is assumed that both spouses know that if they retire, the other 
spouse will retire as well. For both spouses, it would be better to not retire as long as the other 
spouse didn’t retire, and as a result both spouses would continue working. The economic 
rationale for this case is that if one spouse retires, he or she loses not only his or her earnings, but 
the earnings of the other spouse as well. Even if it turns out that having both spouses working 
dominates having both retired, it may be true that allowing the husband to retire first (outcome 
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hC) or the wife to retire first (outcome wC) dominates, for both spouses, having both spouses 
working. If that occurs, then one spouse will allow the other spouse to make the retirement 
decision which delivers a higher utility for both of them. Otherwise, if having both spouses 
working dominates having both retired, the final outcome will be for both spouses to be working. 
C. Unexpected Implications of the Decision Process. 
  There are a couple of implications of this decision process that might not be expected, but 
which have entirely logical explanations. The first is that retirement reversals can occur without 
any changes in preferences (other than the increasing desire for retirement over time) or any 
changes in effective compensation. Normally, without changes in preferences or compensation, 
one would expect that once an individual retired, he or she would stay retired, since nothing has 
changed to bring them out of retirement. But in the present model, that is not always the case. 
  This effect can be illustrated with simple work/retirement decisions, without the need to 
introduce additional complications via partial retirement. Suppose that in a given year, the 
husband’s and the wife’s utility matrices look as follows: 
       H u s b a n d ’ s   D e c i s i o n  
       W o r k    R e t i r e  
                     Husband’s Payoff Matrix 
    Wife’s   Work             5.032577          5.026383 
    Decision  Retire             5.023245          5.015767 
       W i f e ’ s   P a y o f f   M a t r i x  
    Wife’s   Work             5.042582          4.997644 
    Decision  Retire             5.072982          5.026156 
Given these utility matrices, the husband prefers to work for any given retirement state of the 
wife, and the wife prefers to be retired for any given retirement state of the husband. This 
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corresponds to case 4 of the analysis in the previous part of this section, and in that analysis we 
concluded that in this case, the husband will work and the wife will be retired. 
  Suppose that a year later, the utility matrices look as follows: 
       H u s b a n d ’ s   D e c i s i o n  
       W o r k    R e t i r e  
                     Husband’s Payoff Matrix 
    Wife’s   Work             4.924987          4.931819 
    Decision  Retire             4.915709          4.921649 
       W i f e ’ s   P a y o f f   M a t r i x  
    Wife’s   Work             4.932621          4.889473 
    Decision  Retire             4.967829          4.923471 
The utility values are generally a little bit lower, largely reflecting the higher mortality rates as 
individuals age. The wife still prefers retirement regardless of the retirement state of the husband, 
but due to his being a year older, the husband now prefers to be retired regardless of the 
retirement state of the wife. This corresponds to case 1 in the previous analysis. For that case, the 
outcome depended on the comparisons of combination A, where both spouses worked, with 
combination D, where both spouses are retired, for both spouses. For both spouses, combination 
A is preferred, so the final result is that both spouses will be working. Since in the previous year, 
the husband was working but the wife was retired, this means that the wife has switched back to 
working from retirement even without any change in compensation or retirement preferences. 
  The essence of this case can be summarized as follows. In the first year the wife is 
retired, and the husband is working but is close to the border between working and being retired. 
In the following year the husband crosses that border and would be retired if he were just giving 
up his own earnings by doing so. Each spouse knows that if they retire rather than work, the 
other spouse will also retire, because for each of them the extra consumption from their own 
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earnings is insufficient to compensate for the lost leisure. However both spouses know that if 
they retire and as a consequence the other spouse retires as well, they will lose both incomes. 
Since in this example the loss of both incomes outweighs the loss of leisure for either spouse, 
neither spouse sees an advantage in retiring as long as the other spouse does not retire. The wife 
essentially returns to working as an inducement for the husband to continue working and provide 
additional income which benefits them both. 
A second rather unexpected implication of the decision process is that higher wealth at 
the beginning of the period, all other things being equal, may cause the work effort of one of the 
spouses to increase, even if the work effort of the other spouse remains the same. This is contrary 
to the usual implication that a pure wealth effect should cause a decline in labor supply. 
  This effect can again be illustrated with a simple work/retirement decision, without the 
need to introduce additional complications via partial retirement. Suppose that at a given level of 
initial wealth, the husband’s and the wife’s utility matrices look as follows: 
       H u s b a n d ’ s   D e c i s i o n  
       W o r k    R e t i r e  
                     Husband’s Payoff Matrix 
    Wife’s   Work             4.288884          4.266913 
    Decision  Retire             4.266930          4.261674 
       W i f e ’ s   P a y o f f   M a t r i x  
    Wife’s   Work             4.312152          4.271539 
    Decision  Retire             4.315635          4.271357 
Using the previous analysis, this corresponds to case 8. The husband prefers to work regardless 
of the retirement state of the wife. The wife prefers to be retired if the husband works, but if he is 
retired she prefers to work. In the analysis of that case, the outcome depended on a comparison 
of combinations B and C for the husband (B is the combination where the husband retires but the 
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wife works, and C is the combination where the husband works and the wife retires). By a slight 
margin, the husband prefers combination C to combination B, so the final result is that the 
husband works and the wife retires. 
  At a slightly higher level of initial wealth, the two utility matrices look as follows: 
       H u s b a n d ’ s   D e c i s i o n  
       W o r k    R e t i r e  
                     Husband’s Payoff Matrix 
    Wife’s   Work             4.289692          4.267817 
    Decision  Retire             4.267776          4.262585 
       W i f e ’ s   P a y o f f   M a t r i x  
    Wife’s   Work             4.312960          4.272443 
    Decision  Retire             4.316480          4.272268 
Note that all of the utility amounts, conditional on work status, have increased due to the 
increased wealth. The pattern of utilities still fits the criteria for case 8, but in this case the 
husband prefers combination B to combination C. In this case both spouses would like to be the 
first to retire, since they know that if they retire first the other spouse will stay on the job. 
However, if both retire, they will both arrive at combination D, the least preferred result, so they 
both continue to work. Compared to the case with lower initial wealth, the husband’s work effort 
has remained the same, but the wife’s work effort has increased in the case with higher initial 
wealth. 
  The essence of this situation may be explained as follows. At the lower level of wealth, 
the husband finds it advantageous to work even if the wife retires. At a slightly higher level of 
wealth, however, the husband finds retirement somewhat more appealing, he would prefer to be 
retired and have the wife working rather than the other way around. In this case, both spouses 
would like to retire and have the other work, but if they both retire they will be in the worst 
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possible scenario for both of them. To forestall this, both agree to continue working. In essence, 
the wife has changed her behavior to keep the husband working even though he would otherwise 
retire at the higher wealth level. 
D. Nash Equilibrium vs. Sequential Decisions. 
  The difference between Nash equilibria and the results of the decision process described 
above can be readily seen in the bivariate work/retirement scenario, so we will examine it in this 
scenario rather than introduce the further complications of partial retirement. The simplest case is 
illustrated in case 1 in part A of this section. In this case, both spouses would find it to their 
advantage to retire, given either decision of the other spouse. The Nash equilibrium in this case is 
straightforward: both spouses would retire. And yet, the possibility remains that both spouses 
might be better off if both of them continued to work. The decision process described in this 
paper recognizes that both spouses realize that if either of them retire, the other spouse will retire 
as well, and hence they are both reluctant to retire for fear of inducing the other spouse to retire 
as well. The essential difference is that the Nash equilibrium assumes that the actions of one 
spouse have no impact on the decisions of the other spouse, which may be appropriate for a pair 
of prisoners held incommunicado, but is probably less appropriate for spouses. In contrast, the 
decision process of this paper assumes that both spouses realize that their own choices may 
affect the choices of the other spouse. 
  There may also be a case where there is no Nash equilibrium, yet the decision process 
described in this paper will deliver an unambiguous and defensible solution. In terms of the 
classification of cases in Part A of this section, cases 7 and 10 have no Nash equilibria. These are 
cases where one spouse wants to do the same as the other spouse, but the second spouse wants to 
do the opposite of the first spouse. In these cases, no Nash equilibrium can make both spouses 
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completely happy with their decision, given the decision of the other spouse. Case 7 was the case 
where the husband wanted to do the same thing as the wife, but the wife wanted to do the 
opposite of the husband. Utilizing the sequential decision making process, the wife knows that if 
she retires, the husband will as well, and that is her least preferred outcome. So she continues 
working and the husband does too. The wife would really prefer that she retire and the husband 
stays working, but she knows that this is an impossible outcome, because she knows what the 
husband will do in response to her retirement. So she settles for her second best outcome, and the 
decision process has a definite and defensible result in spite of the fact that there are no Nash 
equilibria in this case.  
  In any case, as we have shown, the backward induction method does not always yield the 
exact same result as the Nash equilibrium, even in cases where a Nash equilibrium exists. More 
generally, the Nash equilibrium, which assumes that each spouse takes the decision of the other 
spouse as given, is not always equivalent to methods in which the choice of each spouse takes 
into account the possible responses of the other spouse. 
 
V. Data and Estimation. 
  Estimation in this study is based on data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a 
survey of roughly 7600 households with individuals born from 1931 to 1941.
9 The study uses 
observations from households of married couples for whom both spouses appear to have career 
jobs from which retirement would be a meaningful concept. Details of the sample restrictions, as 
well as the construction of the variables used in the estimation, are described in Appendix 1. 
                                                            
9 The HRS is conducted by the University of Michigan under a grant from the National Institute 
on Aging (grant number U01AG009740). 
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Both spouses in HRS households were interviewed separately. This is true even if one 
spouse was in the eligible birth cohorts but the other was not. The survey started in 1992, at 
which time these individuals were between 51 and 61 years old, and the same households were 
re-interviewed every two years thereafter. This study uses the retirement data through the first 
six waves of the survey, by which time the eligible birth cohorts would have been 61 to 71 years 
of age. By age 61 half of the individuals would have retired, and virtually all by age 71, so this 
period includes the overwhelming majority of retirements for the sample individuals. 
  The HRS also has two important supplements, which are available on a restricted basis. 
First, Social Security earnings records are attached for about 75 percent of the sample, allowing 
fairly precise estimates of Social Security earnings and benefits for this part of the sample. 
Secondly, for respondents who indicated that they had pensions, the survey obtained and coded 
the summary pension documents from the employers of about two thirds of those in the sample 
with a pension on their current job. This enables a much more precise determination of the 
retirement incentives of pensions than is normally obtainable from the respondents themselves. 
  The estimation method is the generalized method of simulated moments (GMM). In this 
procedure, a group of moments is gathered into a column vector  m. These moments are 
generally the difference between some observed statistic, such as the percentage retired as of a 
specific age, and the percentage that is simulated for the sample using specified values of the 
parameter. In general, these moments come from an asymptotically normal distribution with a 
mean value of zero. The estimation procedure seeks the parameter value which minimize  q = 
m'W
-1m,  where  W = ∑ . The  mi  vectors are the moments of the individual 
observations, and the  W  matrix is essentially the observed variance-covariance matrix of the 
moments. Variances of the estimates are calculated from  var(Θ) = [G'W
-1G]







vector of parameters and  G  is the derivative of the moments with respect to the parameters. If 
the model is correctly specified,  m  is distributed around zero, and  q  should have a  χ
2 
distribution with  λ – k  degrees of freedom, where  λ  is the number of moments and  k  is the 
number of parameters estimated. 
  To construct the moments for a specific observation using a specific set of parameters, 
we need first to estimate the value of the time preference parameter  ρ  for the couple associated 
with that observation. To do this, we use the observed full-time retirement dates if the spouses 
have already retired, or the expected retirement dates if one or both spouses have not retired. If 
the retirement from full-time work was into partial retirement, a second retirement date from 
partial retirement into full retirement is established in the same way. These retirement dates fix 
the leisure parts of both utility functions as well as the complete earnings stream for the couple. 
What remains is to compute the consumption stream conditional on a value of  ρ. The 
consumption model is computed using the usual backward induction method of dynamic 
programming models. In this model, the rate of return on assets is taken to be stochastic, using 
the observed distribution of asset returns. The model is then simulated to obtain an associated 
path of wealth, and during this simulation the realized asset returns are used. The calculated 
amount of wealth in a particular year, say 1992, can then be compared with the actual wealth 
observed in that year. The calculated wealth depends on the assumed value of  ρ, and this 
parameter is adjusted up or down until the calculated wealth matches the actual wealth. In these 
calculations, observed wealth is taken to be the sum of financial, real estate, business assets, and 
non-pension retirement assets (e.g., IRA’s). 
  The use of actual or expected retirement dates to calculate  ρ  avoids the necessity of 






the random effects affect only the leisure terms in the utility functions. This approach requires a 
couple of approximations. First, the actual or expected retirement dates refer to situations where 
both spouses survive and do not tell us what would have happened if one of the spouses had 
died. In general, the retirement ages would be expected to depend on the survival experience of 
both spouses, since if one spouse dies the income stream of the surviving spouse will be altered. 
However, since the pre-retirement mortality rates are relatively low, and since the bulk of 
lifetime income will have been earned before the observations begin, we make the approximation 
that the retirement dates of one spouse do not depend on whether the other spouse survives. The 
second approximation is the approximation discussed in Appendix 2. The uncertainty in 
retirement dates in the complete model probably induces couples to hold more assets than if the 
retirement dates were certain, and even then the amount of wealth associated with observed 
retirement dates and asset returns is not completely fixed. However, the discussion in Appendix 
2 suggests that this is probably not a serious problem. The primary purpose of calculating time 
preference rates is to distinguish households which place a substantial value on future utility 
from those for whom present utility is paramount, and this approximation should be sufficient for 
those purposes. 
  Once the time preference rate  ρ  is calculated, we make a random draw from the joint 
distribution of  εh  and  εw, given the parameters  σh,  σw,  and  ρε  of the distribution. We also 
make random draws of     and   ,  given the parameters   ,  ,  ,  and    for those 
distributions. With these preference parameters, the path of retirement states for both spouses can 
be calculated using the methods discussed above, and the values associated with the various 
moments are tabulated. Another draw is made from the distribution of  εh  and  εw . Another set 














moments are updated. The process continues through a large number of simulations (10,000 per 
observation). The moments used in the estimation are calculated by comparing the observed 
tabulations to the simulated distributions. Once the model has been estimated, the calculation of 
the 10,000 simulations does not add appreciably to the time required, so we use this number in 
order to make the simulated moments close to the theoretical moments. However, in order to 
make the calculations feasible, new draws of     and     are not made for each of the 10,000 





  The moments used in the simulation are chosen to provide identifying information on the 
parameters. The moments used are as follows: 
                            N u m b e r  
    Description  of  moments              of  moments 
The percentage retired from full-time work at ages 54-66 
H u s b a n d          1 3  
W i f e           1 3  
The percentage completely retired at ages 55, 58, 60, 62, and 65 
H u s b a n d              5  
W i f e               5  
The percentage retired from full-time work at ages 55, 58, 60, 62, 
    and 65 among families in the bottom third of 
  potential  earnings 
H u s b a n d              5  
W i f e               5  
The percentage retired from full-time work at ages 55, 58, 60, 62, 
    and 65 among families in the upper third of 
  potential  earnings 
H u s b a n d              5  
W i f e               5  
  The percentage retired from full-time work at ages 55, 58, 60, 62 
      and 65 among those in poor health 
  H u s b a n d              5  
  W i f e               5  
  The percentage of reversals where the respondent was working 
   full-time  after  having  been partially or fully retired 
   in  the  previous  interview 
  H u s b a n d              5  
  W i f e               5  
  The percentage of couples in each interview where both spouses 
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   w e r e   w o r k i n g   f u l l - t i m e           6  
  The percentage of cases where one partner was working full-time 
      in one of the later interviews and the other was 
      retired in one of the earlier interviews        6 
 
  T o t a l   m o m e n t s        8 8  
 
  The first 26 moments help to establish the overall pattern of retirements, as governed by  
,   ,   ,   ,  σh,  and  σw. The next 10 moments reflect the amount of partial retirement by 
age, and hence help to establish the values of   ,  ,  ,  and  ,  which determine the 
distribution of the value of partial retirement. The next 20 moments help to establish the value of  
α. The higher the value of  α,  the later will be the retirement of high earning individuals relative 
to the retirement of lower earning individuals. The next 10 moments, which involve those 
individuals in poor health, help to determine     and  β . The following 10 moments, which 
have to do with reversals, help to establish the values of  ρh  and  ρw, which are the changes in 
leisure preferences after retirement which could induce a return to work. The next six moments, 
which relate to joint retirement, help to determine the values of      and  β , which govern how 
much the leisure of one spouse is augmented by the presence of the other spouse. The final six 
moments, which measure how often one spouse retires early and the other spouse retires much 
later, help to establish the value of  ρε,  the correlation between  εh  and  εw. High values of  ρε  
should mean that cases where one spouse retires early and the other much later occur less often 


























  The results of the parameter estimates are given in Table 1. Most if not all of the 
parameter estimates are significant at conventional significance levels.
10 For 70 degrees of 
 
10 If the observed moments do not match the moments generated by the model very well, 
the  q  value will be high and the prob value will be low, indicating that the model is not doing a 
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freedom, the 5% critical value of the  χ
2  distribution is 90.53 and the 1% critical value is 100.43. 
The estimated value of 65.09 is well below these critical values, which indicates that there is 
little evidence that the model does not fit the model well, at least in the dimensions measured by 
the moments previously listed. Another way of looking at this is that the probability value of this 
q value is 0.64, which suggests that by chance, the q value would be higher than the estimated 
amount more than half of the time.
11 
Since this model is a combination of two of our previous models, we can see how 
different these estimates are from those in the previous models. One of the models (Gustman and 
Steinmeier, 2008) was a model of joint retirement decisions for both spouses within a family, but 
that model did not include stochastic returns or any partial retirement. The other model was a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
very good job of explaining the observed data. The degrees of freedom for the  χ
2  distribution is 
equal to the number of moments minus the number of parameters estimations, which for the 
current estimation gives a value of 70. 
11 Other studies have also simplified the estimation of the backward induction 
process. A notable approach that would approximate the solution to the model is 
suggested by Keane and Wolpin (1997). (The description of the Keane-Wolpin method is 
taken from the Appendix in their article in the June1997 JPE.) Unfortunately, their 
approximations do not appear to be applicable to our model. They make use of the fact 
that there is exactly one error term corresponding to each potential choice, which is to say 
that the values of the choices are specified as Vm = fm(S) + εm, where m is a choice and S 
is the set of state variables. Our error terms enter the model in a more structural (and we 
would argue more realistic) way. While it may be possible to use the Monte-Carlo 
methods for simulating expected values, it is not possible to use their method for 
computing E[max(Vm)] from a transformation of more easily computed E[Vm]’s. The 
reason that their E[Vm]’s are easier to compute is that the expectation has to be integrated 
only over the single εm, (in fact, if E[εm] = 0, E(Vm] = fm(S), with no need for integration), 
while E[max(Vm)] has to be multiply integrated over all the εm ‘s. Thus, once they 
estimate the relationship between the E[max(Vm)]’s and the E[Vm]’s from a small 
subsample of the possible state combinations, they can calculate the E[max(Vm)]’s for the 
remaining state combinations without doing any integration at all!  The cost is a relatively 
more restricted error structure tying the errors to the choices in a one-to-one fashion. The 
problem for our model is that since there is no strict correspondence between the potential 
choices and the error terms, the computation of the m E[Vm]’s is as complicated as the 
computation of E[max(Vm)].  
 
  45 
model which included stochastic returns and a mechanism for varying leisure preferences after 
retirement, but took the wife’s labor supply and its associated income as exogenous to the 
husband’s retirement decision. 
  In comparing the current results with the previous family retirement model, the 
coefficient of the age variable for the husband is considerably lower in the present model as 
opposed to the previous model. Since this coefficient to some extent reflects the scope of 
economic circumstances to affect retirement, one would expect that the husband’s retirement 
decision would be more sensitive to economic circumstances in the current model. For the wife, 
however, the coefficient of the age variable is very similar between the two models. 
  The coefficient of the spouse retired variable is about the same for the husbands between 
the two sets of estimates, but the coefficient of this variable is almost twice as high for the wife 
in the current set of estimates as opposed to the previous results. Nevertheless, the husband’s 
coefficient is almost two and a half times as great as that for the wife, which leaves unaltered the 
conclusion from previous work that the husband’s utility of retirement is much more sensitive to 
the presence of the wife than the other way around. Another dimension of joint retirement is the 
correlation of retirement preferences, as measured by the parameter  ρε. That parameter is 
considerably higher in the current estimates than the previous estimates, suggesting that 
correlated preferences may play a greater role. However, the previous estimate of this parameter 
was not very precise, and the confidence interval for that estimate is very close to including the 
current estimate. As a result, it is unclear that this difference in estimates is meaningful. 
  The coefficients of the health variables are slightly higher in the current model than they 
were in the previous family retirement estimates, both for the husband and for the wife. It is not 
completely clear why this should be so, but again the confidence intervals for the previous 
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estimates include the values estimated for the current model. The standard deviation of the 
leisure preference term, which to a large extent governs the overall spread of the retirement 
distribution, is very close between the two estimates for the husbands, but the value for the wife 
is somewhat higher in the current model relative to the previous model. 
  In comparing the current model with the previous stochastic model (Gustman and 
Steinmeier, 2006), the most notable difference is that the leisure preferences change much less 
after retirement in the current model than in the previous model. This is reflected in the 
autocorrelation parameter  ρh,  which measures how autocorrelated the preferences after 
retirement are to the preferences prior to retirement. To a large degree, this parameter reflects 
how often individuals return to work after a period of retirement. As indicated earlier in this 
report, the mechanism by which the retirement decisions are made for couples introduces some 
degree of returns to work, even if there were no other mechanism for inducing returns to work. 
This means that the autocorrelation parameter  ρh  does not have to account for all the returns to 
work, but only a part of them. As a result, it is not terribly surprising that the autocorrelation 
parameter is higher in the current model than it was in the previous model, which assumed that 
the spouse’s retirement was exogenous. 
VI. Simulations. 
  Having obtained estimates for the parameters of the model, we now turn to simulations 
with the model. First we will present results from a simulation using the actual budget sets for 
the individuals in the sample. We refer to this simulation as the “base” simulation. We will then 
present simulations in which the wife is not in the labor force, to see what effect the wife’s work 
has on the husband’s retirement, and simulations in which partial retirement is not permitted. 
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  Table 2 shows the basic retirement outcomes from the base simulation. For both the 
husbands and the wives, the last three rows indicate the percentages of the sample at each age 
who were working full-time, partially retired, or fully retired. As expected, the percentage 
working full-time falls with age and the percentage partially retired increases with age. For 
husbands, by age 62 less than half of the sample is still working full time, while for the wives the 
percentage working full time falls to less than half at age 60. Both husbands and wives have 
substantial numbers partially retired. For the husbands, the percentage partially retired grows 
steady throughout the age range illustrated until it reaches almost 20 percent at age 67. For 
wives, partial retirement grows at earlier ages, reaches a peak of around 17 percent at age 62, and 
declines thereafter. 
  The first two columns of the table are what may be referred to as “pseudo” retirement. 
These are merely the differences between the figures at adjacent ages in the last three rows. For 
instance, 32.1 percent of husbands were fully retired at age 61 and 42.8 percent at age 62. The 
difference of 10.7 percent is taken as the pseudo-retirements from work at age 62. It is really a 
net result of individuals completely retiring at that age less the individuals who had been retired 
at 61 but who returned to work at age 62. In any case, the prominent feature of these numbers is 
the spike of retirements at age 62, both for the husbands and to a lesser extent for the wives. The 
magnitude of the spike is approximately correct relative to the raw data for the husbands but is a 
little short for the wives. The model is a little less successful in capturing the secondary spike at 
age 65 for the husbands and not very successful at capturing the secondary spike for the wives. 
In any case, the current model is much more successful in capturing the spikes than was our 
previous family model, in which the spikes were substantially muted. As mentioned before, this 
probably has to do with the much lower estimated coefficent for the age variable for the husband, 
  48 
which makes the husband’s retirement behavior more sensitive to economic incentives in the 
current model. 
  Table 3 decomposes both the full-time work figures and the partial retirement figures in 
the last three columns of the previous table. The full-time work percentages are decomposed into 
two parts, one for individuals who are still working in career jobs and who have never previously 
either fully or partially retired and the other for individuals who previously fully or partially 
retired and who have returned to full-time work. For both husbands and wives, the percentage of 
the sample who have returned to full-time work rises gradually up until about age 60, peaks at 
around 9 percentage points in the early 60’s, and tails off thereafter. At its peak at age 61, more 
than 16 percent (9.4 / 57.2) of full-time husbands are individuals who have returned to full-time 
work after a period of full or partial retirement. For wives, the figure is even higher at 21 percent 
(8.8 / 42.5). Although the numbers of full-time workers decline both in the career jobs and in the 
return jobs after age 61, the percentage of full-time workers who have been previously retired 
continues to grow until it reaches 28 percent for husbands at age 67 and 30 percent for wives at 
the same age. 
  For partial retirement, the decomposition is between those who have partially retired 
from full-time work without going through a period of full retirement and those who have been 
fully retired at some previous point. From the table, it is clear that the majority of part-time work 
is done by individuals who are on a traditional path of moving from full-time work to partial 
retirement and then to full retirement, but part-time work by individuals who have previously 
been fully retired is not insignificant. For the husbands, a little over a third of part-time workers 
in their mid to late 50’s have been previously retired. This figure increases during the early 60’s 
until by age 67 around half of the part-time husbands have previously been fully retired. The 
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same trend occurs for the wives, though the percentages of previously retired part-time workers 
is somewhat lower, particularly in the mid 50’s. 
  Table 3 indicates the percentage of individuals who had returned to full-time work from 
partial or full retirement and the percentage who had returned to part-time work after full 
retirement, but it does not indicate the frequency with which husbands and wives go through at 
least one period of transitioning from a state of greater retirement to a state of less retirement. 
Table 4 provides this information. For both husbands and wives, around a third returned to full-
time work at some point in time after a period of partial or full retirement, with the percentage 
being slightly higher among wives than among husbands. The percent returning to part-time 
work after a period of full retirement was around a quarter for both husbands and wives. Since 
these are not mutually exclusive categories, they cannot simply be added up since some 
individuals will go through both transitions. Accordingly, the last row of the table suggests that a 
little over two fifths of husbands go through a period of transition from greater retirement to less 
retirement, and almost half of the wives do so. 
  Table 5 addresses one of the issues particular to a model of the retirement behavior of 
couples, namely, the frequency with which both spouses retire at the same time. The figures in 
the top part of the table give the frequencies for which the husband retires before the wife, and 
the figures in the bottom part of the table give the frequencies for which the wife retires before 
the husband. Despite the fact that on average the husband is a couple of years older than the wife, 
the husband retires first in only about half the cases, while the wife retires first in around 36 
percent of the cases. The remaining 13.5 percent of the cases are instances where both spouses 
retire in the same year. Note that this is around 10 to 11 percentage points higher than the 
surrounding figures, which measure the instances where the husband retires a year or two before 
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the wife, or the wife retires a year or two before the husband. This is almost surely a result of the 
spouse retirement variables in the model, which increase the value of leisure of one spouse if the 
other spouse is also retired. The correlation in leisure preferences would also lead to an increased 
tendency for spouses to both retire early or both retire late, but a correlation in leisure 
preferences should lead to more of a smooth hump in the joint retirement distribution as opposed 
to a spike, as found in studies of joint retirement outcomes.  
  Table 6 reports on another distribution of interest, namely, the distribution of time 
preferences. Not quite half of the households have a time preference rate of less than 5%, while 
around a third have time preference rates of 50% or higher. The latter group essentially has no 
financial assets other than forced savings, meaning that they are effectively consuming all of 
their available income. Only around a sixth of the households fall in the middle, with time 
preference rates between 5% and 50%, and most of those are in the bracket from 5% to 10%. The 
clear implication of this result is that models which assume that all households have a uniform 
time preference rate will almost certainly yield very misleading results for a third of the 
households, but models which allow two mass points for the time preference distribution, one at 
a relatively low time preference rate and the other at a relatively high time preference rate, may 
be a lot closer to the truth. Even here, though, as suggested by Figure 2 in the appendix, there is a 
very substantial difference between the amount of wealth that would be accumulated by an 
individual with a 1% time preference rate relative to an individual with a 3% time preference 
rate, and a model with only two mass points of time preference is unlikely to reflect this 
difference. 
  We now turn to two simulations which address a couple of interesting questions. The first 
has to do with the effect on husband’s retirement of having the wife in the labor force. To shed 
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some light on this subject, we examine a simulation in which the wife is assumed to be out of the 
labor force. The results of this simulation are reported in Table 7. The figures in the table are 
differences between the simulation holding the wife out of the labor force and the base 
simulation. As might be expected, excluding the wife from the labor force leads to a substantial 
increase in full-time work by the husband. From the husband’s viewpoint, the income provided 
by the wife is largely an increase in family resources not associated with his work. Taking away 
this wealth leads to a wealth effect, which should have the impact of reducing both leisure and 
consumption. The reduction in leisure is mainly reflected in increased full-time work effort, 
amounting to over 13 percentage points in the early 60’s. Leisure itself, as reflected in the 
percentage of the sample being fully retired, drops by a comparable amount, again reaching 
around 13 percent in the early 60’s. During the 50’s and early 60’s, the percentage of the sample 
who are partially retired is reduced, but after that age partial retirement is increased by the 
exclusion of women from the labor force. To put it another way, in the early years full-time work 
is increased substantially at the expense of both partial retirement and full retirement, but in later 
years full retirement is increased substantially at the expense of both full-time work and partial 
retirement. In any case, it seems clear that all else being equal, the flow of wives into the labor 
force in the last few decades has probably reduced the amount of work that the husbands would 
have done otherwise. 
  A second simulation looks to see what would be the effect if work were a full time or 
nothing decision. This is meant to address the issue of the effects of the possibility of part-time 
work on overall work effort. One of the arguments in favor of expanding the opportunities for 
part-time work is that increased part-time work would expand overall work effort by allowing 
older Americans to work into years when health or other issues might make it impossible or 
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difficult to work full-time. Table 8 presents results from a simulation where the option to work 
part-time is effectively eliminated and the respondents would be forced to choose only between 
full-time work and full retirement. The figures in this table are the differences between the 
percentage of individuals in the stated work/retirement category in this simulation and the 
comparable percentage of individuals in the base simulation. For instance, the first entry in the 
table, 1.9 percent, means that at age 55, the number of husbands working full-time would be 1.9 
percentage points higher if part-time work were eliminated as a possibility. Note that the sum of 
the two columns for each gender is the percent of individuals partially retired in Table 2. That is, 
of the 3.4 percent of husbands who were partially retired in the base simulation, if partial 
retirement were eliminated 1.9 percent of them would switch to full-time work and 1.5 percent of 
them would switch to being fully retired. 
  In general, eliminating partial retirement would lead to increases both in the number 
working full-time, which would increase overall work effort, and in the number fully retired, 
which would reduce overall work effort. For husbands, the increase in full-time work outweighs 
the increase in full retirement up until about age 62, which means that up until that age overall 
work effort would increase if partial retirement were eliminated. After age 62, for the husbands 
the elimination of partial retirement would cause the increase in full retirement to outweigh the 
increase in full-time work, which would imply a reduction in overall work effort for this group. 
For the entire 55 to 67 age range illustrated in the table, the increase in full retirement outweighs 
the increase in full-time work, but only by a small amount. 
  Making partial retirement more generally available or more attractive, of course, would 
have the opposite effect. One might expect that the husbands would exhibit a slight increase in 
overall work effort as individuals continued to work in partial retirement beyond the date that 
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they would otherwise retire. This effect, however, is largely offset because with the increased 
availability of partial retirement, individuals would be induced to leave full-time work for partial 
retirement earlier than they would have left full-time work in the absence of partial retirement. 
The simulation suggests that this offsetting effect is sufficient to largely negate any effort to 
promote opportunities for partial retirement as a means to increase overall work. The goal of 
increasing work effort, in turn, is often promoted as a means of stabilizing Social Security’s 
finances or for other ends. 
  The pattern for the wives is similar to that for the husbands, although there are some 
important differences. Before age 62, partial retirement among the wives is more common than 
among husbands, so the increases in full-time work and in full retirement are both greater than 
for the husbands. It is still true, however, that before age 62 the increase in full-time work from 
eliminating partial retirement outweighs the increase in full retirement. After age 62, the reverse 
is true: the figures are less for the wives than for the husbands, and the increase in the percentage 
fully retired is larger than the increase in the percentage working full-time. Again, over the entire 
age range, the increase in the percentage fully retired outweighs the increase in the percentage 
working full-time, but only by a small amount. Therefore, the implications about the goals of 
increasing opportunities for partial retirement among the wives are essentially the same as the 
implications for the husbands outlined in the previous paragraph. 
 
VII. Conclusions. 
  This paper has integrated many features of retirement models into a single framework. 
This has made it possible to utilize the full set of labor market information provided by the 
Health and Retirement Study, including survey responses, pension plan descriptions and Social 
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Security earnings data provided individually for husbands and wives. The integrated model is 
much richer than previously specified models of family retirement, allowing each spouse to retire 
and unretire, transitioning among the states of full-time work, partial retirement and full 
retirement. It explains in much greater detail the effects of interdependence in the decisions made 
by each spouse, including clustering of retirements by husbands and wives, while at the same 
time allowing for forward looking behavior, explaining saving at the family level, incorporating 
the nonlinear budget constraints from still dominant defined benefit pensions and Social 
Security, and allowing for the effects of exogenous shocks to market opportunities, health and 
asset returns.  
As we found in our past research, increasing the richness of the model allows us to 
address phenomena that otherwise cannot be explained by conventional models of retirement. At 
the family level we are able to isolate the key role of heterogeneity in time preference, allowing 
the model to explain the wide differences in wealth accumulated by families with similar 
earnings opportunities. The retirement hazard exhibits the important spike in retirement at age 62 
in the face of an actuarially fair Social Security system, captures the extent of partial retirement 
by each spouse, reproduces the flow from states of greater to lesser retirement, and relates each 
of the flows for one spouse to the decisions made by the other. We also allow each spouse to 
have heterogeneous preferences for both full-time and part-time work.  
  The theoretical discussion increases understanding of the wide variety of situations that 
families face when approaching the retirement decision. It illustrates how choices focused on one 
spouse’s welfare will take account of the welfare and independent reactions of their mate, 
incorporating the roles of different preferences and different market opportunities. Allowing for 
the variety of circumstances facing different families, the theoretical framework incorporates the 
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many different situations facing different couples into a unified framework, and directly into the 
estimation. We also have shown why, when both spouses realize that their own choices may 
affect the choices of the other spouse, a solution method based on backward induction is superior 
to a method based on a Nash equilibrium, including a finding that a solution based on backward 
induction may provide plausible behavioral predictions when the Nash equilibrium criteria fall 
silent in attempting to predict the optimal solution.   
We have found some surprising implications of the model. For example, retirement 
reversals can occur without any changes in preferences (other than the increasing desire for 
retirement over time) or any changes in effective compensation. Also, contrary to the usual 
implication that a pure wealth effect should cause a decline in labor supply, higher wealth at the 
beginning of the period, all other things being equal, may cause the work effort of one of the 
spouses to increase, even if the work effort of the other spouse remains the same.  
Simpler specifications cannot simultaneously explain heterogeneity in wealth; liquidity 
preference and retirement spikes when benefits become available; the high rate of return from 
states of lesser work to states of greater work despite the assumption of forward looking 
behavior, and in the absence of changes either in preferences or in market opportunities; the 
different sequence of retirements by husbands and wives; and why in some cases increased 
wealth may reduce retirements.  
Comparisons of the integrated model of retirement behavior with models that either 
simplify the retirement options and dynamic, stochastic nature of decision making, or simplify or 
ignore the importance of interdependence of retirement decision making in a family setting, have 
shown the value of the estimates obtained with the integrated model. While preserving key 
findings, such as the conclusion from previous work that the husband’s utility of retirement is 
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much more sensitive to the presence of the wife than the other way around, the integrated model 
can explain the key features of retirement outcomes that a simple specification of the family 
model failed to explain, including the ability to simulate with accuracy the spike in retirements at 
age 62. There also are substantial differences in key coefficients between the integrated more 
constrained specifications, such as in the coefficient on age, which governs the sensitivity of the 
retirement response to incentives from policies, as well as changes in preferences after 
retirement, which are smaller in the integrated model. 
We find interesting effects from counter factual experiments. The flow of wives into the 
labor force in the last few decades has probably reduced the amount of work that the husbands 
would have done otherwise. In the early years full-time work is increased substantially at the 
expense of both partial retirement and full retirement, but in later years full retirement is 
increased substantially at the expense of both full-time work and partial retirement. In another 
experiment, we find that eliminating partial retirement would lead to increases both in the 
number working full-time, which would increase overall work effort, and in the number fully 
retired, which would reduce overall work effort. Altogether, the increase in full retirement 
outweighs the increase in full-time work, but the difference is small. The simulation suggests that 
this offsetting effect is sufficient to largely negate any effort to promote opportunities for partial 
retirement as a means to increase overall work. 
  Although there is a great deal of effort required to estimate and simulate with a structural 
model that incorporates many dimensions of behavior, it appears to be worth the effort. One 
reward is an increased understanding of behavior, providing insight into many dimensions of 
retirement behavior, and behavior at the family level, that is not otherwise available from more 
simplified approaches. Another reward is a clearer picture of the likely effects of events, where 
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simplified approaches either fall silent or, worse, may provide misleading guidance for policies. 
In previous studies we have examined the effects of various policies on retirement. In a longer 
report to the National Institute on Aging, we also apply the present model to analyze the effects 
of delaying the Social Security early entitlement age and the effects of substituting defined 
contribution for defined benefit plans. The implications of these and related changes for saving 
and retirement simply cannot be understood when behavior must be analyzed with a less 
structural approach. Since the Health and Retirement Study has been designed to support these 
complex analyses, there is additional effort required to design and estimate the basic behavioral 
models incorporating all the relevant dimensions of behavior, but additional effort is not required 





Parameter         Estimated  Absolute 
    Symbol    Description           Value t-Statistic 
 
    H u s b a n d ’ s   P a r a m e t e r s  
 
    Parameters for the Value of Leisure 

























           Age                   0.12       5.43 
           Own Health                 6.00       5.84 
           Spouse Retired               2.63       2.20 
    σh        Standard Deviation of  εh             4.75       7.44 
    ρh    Correlation  of    εh  After Retirement           0.86     14.01 
 
    Parameters for the Value of Partial Retirement 
          Constant                -0.68       1.47 
          Age                   0.24       2.58 
 
    Wife’s  Parameters 
 
    Parameters for the Value of Leisure 
           Constant              -10.35     49.73 
           Age                   0.19       4.16 
           Own Health                 4.25       3.77 
           Spouse Retired               1.18       0.75 
    σw       Standard Deviation of  εw             5.04       8.42 
    ρw    Correlation  of    εw  After Retirement           0.87     18.12 
 
    Parameters for the Value of Partial Retirement 
          Constant                -6.14       4.02 
          Age                   0.06       0.32 
 
 
    ρε   Correlation  Between    εh  and  εw               0.67       1.70 
α  Consumption Parameter              -0.47       4.80 
Number of observations        851 




Retirement States in Base Simulation, By Age and Gender 
           
   Percent       
    Pseudo-Retiring     Percent    
   From  From  in  Partially  Fully 
Age    FT Work  All Work  FT Work  Retired  Retired 
           
   Husbands 
           
55   3.5  2.7  87.4  3.4  9.2 
56   2.5  1.8  84.9  4.1  11.0 
57   4.3  3.0  80.6  5.4  14.0 
58   4.2  3.4  76.4  6.1  17.5 
59   5.7  4.3  70.7  7.5  21.8 
60   7.2  5.4  63.5  9.3  27.2 
61   6.4  4.9  57.2  10.8  32.1 
62   14.7  10.7  42.5  14.7  42.8 
63   6.9  5.4  35.6  16.2  48.2 
64   6.8  5.7  28.8  17.3  53.9 
65   7.9  7.0  20.8  18.3  60.9 
66   5.3  5.0  15.5  18.6  65.9 
67   3.9  3.5  11.6  19.0  69.4 
           
   Wives 
           
55   4.6  3.2  76.0  6.9  17.1 
56   4.3  3.1  71.7  8.1  20.2 
57   5.0  3.5  66.7  9.6  23.7 
58   5.6  4.1  61.1  11.1  27.8 
59   6.1  4.4  55.1  12.8  32.1 
60   6.6  5.4  48.5  14.0  37.5 
61   6.0  5.0  42.5  14.9  42.5 
62   10.5  8.8  32.1  16.7  51.3 
63   6.3  6.9  25.7  16.1  58.2 
64   5.1  6.3  20.6  14.9  64.5 
65   4.8  6.2  15.8  13.5  70.7 
66   3.6  5.4  12.2  11.7  76.1 





Returns to Work in Base Simulation, By Age and Gender 
          
     Percent  Percent  Percent 
    Percent  to FT Work  in PT Work  in PT Work 
Age   in  Main  after  after  after 
   Job  Retiring  FT  Work  Retiring 
          
   Husbands 
          
55   82.3  5.1  2.3  1.1 
56   78.8  6.1  2.6  1.5 
57   73.8  6.8  3.5  1.9 
58   68.5  7.9  3.9  2.2 
59   62.2  8.5  4.8  2.7 
60   54.5  9.0  5.9  3.4 
61   47.7  9.4  6.7  4.1 
62   35.9  6.6  9.9  4.8 
63   28.9  6.7  10.0  6.2 
64   22.9  5.9  10.0  7.3 
65   16.1  4.8  10.2  8.1 
66   11.6  4.0  9.7  8.9 
67   8.4  3.2  9.4  9.6 
          
   Wives 
          
55   69.8  6.1  4.9  2.0 
56   64.7  7.0  5.8  2.3 
57   59.0  7.7  6.7  2.9 
58   52.9  8.3  7.6  3.5 
59   46.5  8.6  8.5  4.3 
60   39.7  8.8  9.0  5.0 
61   33.8  8.8  9.3  5.6 
62   25.8  6.3  11.0  5.7 
63   20.8  5.0  9.8  6.3 
64   16.3  4.3  8.6  6.3 
65   11.9  3.9  7.6  5.9 
66   8.7  3.5  6.3  5.4 




Respondent Returning to Work in Base Simulation, By Gender 
    
 Husbands  Wives
    
Percent returning to full time work after full or partial retirement  29.0  34.4 
Percent returning to part time work after full retirement  23.7  25.7 
Percent returning to full time work after full or partial retirement     




Distribution of Differences in Retirement 
Years in Base Simulation 
        
   Difference     
   in  Retirement     
   Dates    Percent  of 
   (Years)    Households 
       
   10+   19.3 
   9   3.1 
   8   3.3 
   7   3.4 
Husband   6    3.5 
Retires   5    3.5 
First   4    3.7 
   3   3.6 
   2   3.6 
   1   3.5 
   0   13.5 
   1   2.2 
   2   2.8 
   3   2.9 
Wife   4    3.2 
Retires   5    3.5 
first   6    3.3 
   7   3.4 
   8   3.0 
   9   2.7 
   10+   9.1 
       
Note:  The retirement date is the year the 




Distribution of Time Preference 
Rates in Base Simulation 
    
Time    
Preference   Percent  of 
Rate   Households 
    
0-5%   44.5 
5-10%   12.6 
10-25%   8.0 
25-50%   1.9 





Simulated Effect on Husbands Retirement Status 
of Eliminating Wife's Labor Force Participation 
      
  Change in Percent 
 in  Full  Partially  Fully 
Age Time  Work  Retired  Retired 
      
 Husbands 
55 7.8  -2.4  -5.5 
56 9.3  -2.5  -6.7 
57 11.1  -3.0 -8.1 
58 12.4  -2.8 -9.5 
59 12.8  -2.5  -10.3 
60 13.1  -2.1  -11.0 
61 13.3  -1.5  -11.9 
62 9.7  3.5  -13.2 
63 8.9  4.0  -12.9 
64 7.6  4.5  -12.1 
65 6.0  4.3  -10.4 
66 5.0  4.6  -9.6 






Simulated Effect of Eliminating Partial Retirement 
            
    Change in Percent    Change in Percent 
    in Full  Fully  in Full  Fully 
Age    Time Work  Retired  Time Work  Retired 
            
   Husbands  Wives 
55    1.9 1.5  3.5 3.4 
56    2.4 1.7  4.2 3.9 
57    3.4 2.0  5.3 4.3 
58    4.2 1.9  6.3 4.8 
59    5.0 2.5  7.3 5.5 
60    6.1 3.2  8.0 6.0 
61    7.0 3.7  8.0 7.0 
62   7.8  6.9  6.4  10.2 
63   7.9  8.3  6.1  10.0 
64   7.3  10.0  5.1  9.8 
65   6.9  11.4  4.4  9.1 
66   5.9  12.7  3.6  8.1 
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